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[*I]

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether execution by electrocution generally, and in Florida's electric chair
specifically, violate the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. [*III]
View Table of Contents
View Table of Authorities
[*1]

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE n1

n1 Both parties have consented to the appearance of amicus curiae in this
matter. No counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person or entity, other than amicus curiae, has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Sup. Ct. Rule 37.6.
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics is based at Fordham University
School of Law. The Stein Center reflects the law school's commitment to
teaching, legal scholarship, and professional service that promote the role of
ethical perspectives in legal practice, legal institutions, and the development
of the law itself. Toward this end, the Stein Center sponsors programs, develops
publications, and supports scholarship on contemporary issues of law and ethics,
and encourages professional and public institutions to integrate moral
perspectives into their work. Over the past decade, the Stein Center and
affiliated Fordham Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of the
administration of criminal justice, as well as questions of biomedical ethics.
Because Bryan v. Moore calls into question the extent of courts' adherence to
"evolving standards of decency," we believe that the Stein Center's
consideration of the contours of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment may provide the Court with a unique perspective on
the issues relevant to this case.

[*2] Edward A. Brunner, M.D., Ph.D., is Emeritus Chairman and James
Eckenhoff Professor of Anesthesia at Northwestern University School of Medicine.
Professor Brunner, a specialist in anesthesiology and pain therapy, has authored
many articles on anesthesiology and the amelioration of pain. Professor Brunner
also founded the Low Back and Pain Clinic at the Rehabilitation Institute of
Chicago and has been active in the Anesthesia Department's pain clinic at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital.
Robert A. Burt, J.D., is the Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law at Yale
University. Professor Burt, an expert in constitutional law and law and
medicine, is the author of Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in DoctorPatient Relations and The Constitution in Conflict, as well as numerous articles
addressing constitutional and medical ethics issues. Since 1990, Professor Burt
has chaired the Board of Trustees of the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law and is currently the chair or member of many other
medical/legal organizations, including the Institute of Medicine and the
National Academy of Sciences.
Margaret A. Farley, Ph.D., is the Gilbert L. Stark Professor of Christian
Ethics at Yale University Divinity School. Professor Farley, who has won a long
list of awards and published widely in books and articles on topics addressing
Christian, medical, and societal ethics, is currently president of the Catholic
Theological Society of America and past president of the Society of Christian
Ethics. Professor Farley, an advisory board member of various ethics committees,
also co-chairs the Executive Committee of the Yale Interdisciplinary Bioethics
Forum, which coordinates all bioethics research and teaching in the various
schools at Yale University.
[*3] Sherwin B. Nuland, M.D., is Clinical Professor of Surgery at Yale
School of Medicine. Professor Nuland is the author of Doctors: The Biography of
Medicine, Medicine: The Art of Healing, How We Die (winner of the National Book
Award in 1994), and The Wisdom of the Body: How We Live. Professor Nuland is
chairman of the board of managers of the Journal of the History of Medicine and
Allied Sciences, literary editor of Connecticut Medicine, a member of the
editorial board of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, as well as a member of
the Yale Interdisciplinary Bioethics Forum.
STATEMENT
On July 8, 1999, Allen Lee Davis' execution in Florida's electric chair
gained national and international attention. Post-execution photos and testimony
indicated that Davis suffered a nose bleed that poured down his shirt, that he
evidenced deep burns on his head, face, and body, and that he was partially
asphyxiated before and during the electrocution from the five-inch-wide mouth
strap that belted him to the chair's head-rest. There was also testimony that
after guards placed the mouth strap on him, Davis' face became red and he
repeatedly mouthed and attempted to yell to the guards in an effort to get their
attention. Provenzano v. Moore, No. 95973, 1999 WL 756012 (Fla. Sept. 24, 1999)
*20-22 (Shaw, J., dissenting). In the post-execution photos taken by Department
of Corrections personnel, "a sponge placed under [Davis'] head-piece obscures
the top portion of his head down to his eyebrows; because of the width of the
mouth-strap, only a small portion of Davis' face is visible above the mouthstrap and below the sponge, and that portion is bright purple and scrunched
tightly upwards; his eyes are clenched shut and his nose is pushed so severely
upward that it is barely visible above the mouth-strap." Id. at *22.

[*4] Thomas Provenzano, who was scheduled to be executed in Florida State
Prison the next day, filed a petition with the Florida Supreme Court seeking a
stay of execution and arguing that the state's electric chair was cruel and
unusual punishment. The Florida Supreme Court remanded Provenzano's case to the
circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the constitutionality of
Florida's electric chair. After the hearing, the circuit court held that
electrocution in Florida's electric "is not unconstitutional." Provenzano, at *
3. In a 4-3 per curiam opinion, a plurality of the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed in three pages the circuit court's "finding that the electric chair is
not unconstitutional." Id. at * 3. Moreover, the plurality reiterated its
previous holding in Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1997), that had rejected
the claim that Florida's use of electrocution violated "evolving standards of
decency." Provenzano, at * 3. The court implied there was no need to readdress
the "evolving standards of decency" issue.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Eighth Amendment was enacted to proscribe "torturous" and "barbarous"
punishments, the penalties most commonly associated with executions. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(per curiam). As yet, however, no court has
provided a modern and comprehensive Eighth Amendment review of any execution
method, including electrocution. In general, courts dismiss constitutional
challenges to electrocution entirely by relying on the outdated precedent of In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). In Kemmler, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the states and therefore never addressed directly the
constitutionality of electrocution. Id. at 443. Alternatively, as in Provenzano,
courts engage in a brief Eighth Amendment review that focuses predominantly on
the amount of pain inflicted while ignoring other Eighth Amendment standards.
[*5] A modern and comprehensive Eighth Amendment review of medical,
historical, and societal evidence demonstrates that electrocution does not
comport with "evolving standards of decency." Electrocution inflicts unnecessary
pain and physical violence, and is at risk of continuing to do so given a
demonstrated pattern of botched electrocutions. Moreover, legislative trends
show a clear and consistent break from electrocution. If the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is applied in the way that it was originally intended, the
Court would find electrocution unconstitutional.
I. KEMMLER WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION UNDER MODERN EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS
When the United States Constitution was being ratified, the Framers included
in the Bill of Rights a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments created
expressly to proscribe the kinds of "torturous" and "barbarous" penalties
associated with certain methods of execution. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. To
date, however, courts generally have provided only superficial Eighth Amendment
review of the constitutionality of execution methods, particularly
electrocution. Most commonly, courts dismiss the electrocution challenge
entirely (often in one sentence) by relying on the century-old precedent of In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). See Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution An
Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century,
35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 551, 616-23 (1994) [hereinafter Denno-I] (collecting
authorities); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?
, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 321-54 [*6] (1997) [hereinafter, Denno-II] (collecting
authorities). n2 In Kemmler, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not
apply to the states and deferred to the New York legislature's conclusion that
electrocution was not a cruel and unusual punishment under the state's
Electrical Execution Act. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443.

n2 Reprints of Professor Denno's William & Mary Law Review and Iowa Law
Review articles are being lodged with the Clerk, for the convenience of the
Court.
For a range of reasons, Kemmler's precedential value has diminished
substantially over the last century. First, the Kemmler Court never specifically
employed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause even though post-incorporation
cases have continued mistakenly to cite Kemmler as an Eighth Amendment case. See
Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 334 (collecting cases). Next, the Kemmler Court
adopted the burden of proof promulgated by the New York court that required the
prisoner to show "beyond doubt" that the execution method was cruel and unusual.
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442. However, this standard has not been used since Kemmler
in death penalty cases. Although courts, as in Provenzano, typically fail to
identify the burden of proof when reviewing the constitutionality of execution
methods, the burden of proof courts cite most frequently--preponderance of the
evidence--is far less stringent. Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 335 (collecting
cases). Moreover, a court reviewing electrocution under the Eighth Amendment
would not defer to the state's legislature to the extent this Court did when
deciding Kemmler. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442-43 (quoting the New York Supreme
Court's explanation of why it deferred to the legislature). Most critically,
Kemmler was decided before anyone had been electrocuted; therefore, the Court
had limited evidence in reaching its conclusion. Historical analyses suggest
[*7] that Kemmler was based in large part on the law, science, and politics of
the time as well as the particular uncertainties resulting from the passage of
New York's Electrocution Act. See generally Craig Brandon, The Electric Chair:
An Unnatural American History 7-159 (1999); Denno-I, 35 Wm. L. Rev. at 562-604
(detailing the competition between Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse
concerning whose current would dominate the electrical industry).
Both legally and scientifically, then, Kemmler's 1890 electrocution was a
"human experiment." By all accounts, the experiment failed. In graphic detail,
the media reported the confusion, mistakes, and physical violence that resulted
from Kemmler's execution. Regardless, electrocution became a popular means of
execution in other states, which also reported mishaps and botches. See Brandon
at 7-257; Denno-I, 35 Wm. L. Rev. at 599-676. Seemingly, the desire to
perpetuate the death penalty outweighed any humanitarian goal to switch to a new
method. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 388-94.
The Kemmler Court's factual assumptions regarding the acceptability of
electrocution have no support in light of modern evidence of electrocution's
effects on the human body. See, e.g., Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 933 (1993)
(Souter, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ, respecting denial of
certiorari) (emphasizing that Kemmler was not "a dispositive response to
litigation of the issue [of the constitutionality of electrocution] in light of
modern knowledge"). One of the Kemmler Court's legal conclusions, however,
remains viable: "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death.... something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Kemmler, 136
U.S. at 447.
Since 1962, when the Court held in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962), that the Eighth [*8] Amendment applies to the states, the Court's
Eighth Amendment doctrine has emphasized an "evolving standard of decency." See
Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 337-38 (collecting cases). Consistent with the
"evolving standards of decency" and Kemmler's "torture and lingering death"
standards, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence suggests four interrelated
criteria for determining the constitutionality of an execution method: (1) "the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," (2) "nothing less than" human
dignity (e.g., "a minimization of physical violence during execution"), (3) the
risk of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and (4) "evolving standards
of decency" as measured by "objective factors to the maximum extent possible,"
such as legislation passed by elected representatives or public attitudes. See
Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 321-402 (collecting cases).
In Provenzano, the Florida Supreme Court's skeletal per curiam opinion
virtually ignored the great bulk of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court effectively begged the question of
electrocution's continued propriety under an "evolving standards of decency"
test. Indeed, no court has reviewed the constitutionality of electrocution under
modern Eighth Amendment standards which consider, as a substantial part of an
"evolving standards of decency" analysis, legislative trends and related
information, such as public opinion polls.
II. MODERN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT EXECUTION BY
ELECTROCUTION CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Under the Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, pain is only one of
a range of factors suggesting that an execution by electrocution constitutes
cruel and [*9] unusual punishment. This section discusses briefly the pain and
physical violence of electrocution, but then focuses on other Eighth Amendment
criteria, most particularly the strong showing of legislative trends away from
electrocution.
A. Electrocution Constitutes "Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain"
The most recent research and eyewitness observations suggest that many
factors associated with electrocution, such as severe burning, boiling body
fluids, asphyxiation, and cardiac arrest, can cause extreme pain when
unconsciousness is not instantaneous. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 354-58
(summarizing available medical publications, eyewitness reports, and affidavit
testimony). Table 9 (App., infra) provides brief summaries of nineteen botched
electrocutions following Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), when the Court
ended its moratorium on the death penalty. See id. at 168-207. These botches
provide considerable evidence of extensive pain and suffering experienced by
electrocuted prisoners. Notably, even a routine or "properly performed"
electrocution can cause intense pain and a lingering death. See Sherwin B.
Nuland, M.D., Cruel and Unusual, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1999, at A25 ("Even when it
functions exactly as it should, the electric chair is a brutal killer."); see
also Sherwin B. Nuland, How We Die: Reflections on Life's Final Chapter (1993)
(discussing different methods of death and the pain associated with them).
B. Electrocution Constitutes "Physical Violence" and Offends "Human Dignity"
Evidence of mutilation resulting from electrocution is derived from three
sources: post-execution autopsies, which are required in some states;
observations provided by experts; and [*10] witnesses' descriptions of
executions, some of which are detailed in App., Table 9, infra. The effects of
electrocution on the human body include the following: charring of the skin and
severe external burning, such as the possible burning away of the ear; exploding
of the penis; defecation and micturition, which necessitate that the condemned
person wear a diaper; drooling and vomiting; blood flowing from facial orifices;
intense muscle spasms and contractions; odors resulting from the burning of the
skin and the body; and extensive sweating and swelling of skin tissue. Denno-II,
82 Iowa L. Rev. at 359.

Similar to Allen Lee Davis' execution, for example, the execution of Wilbert
Lee Evans in Virginia resulted in substantial bleeding. According to accounts by
witnesses and reporters, blood poured from Evans' eyes and nose, drenching his
shirt. Moreover, the flames witnessed during the 1990 execution of Jesse Joseph
Tafero and the 1997 execution of Pedro Medina made the public explicitly aware
of how a human body could be burned and distorted during an electrocution. See
App. Table 9, infra.
C. Electrocution Constitutes the Risk of "Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of
Pain"
When legislatures or courts validate the use of electrocution, they presume
that prison officials will carry out executions properly and that equipment will
not malfunction. A focus on electrocutions in all states and over time, however,
reveals the potential for prison personnel's contribution to a risk of
unnecessary pain.
In 1990, for example, the botched electrocution of Jesse Joseph Tafero in
Florida suggested there was a substantial likelihood the state's execution
procedure could result in severe pain and prolonged agony. Subsequently, a
pattern of [*11] consecutive malfunctions has been established with the
botched electrocution of Pedro Medina and, now, James Allen Davis. Tafero's and
Medina's executions shared similar problems (most particularly difficulties with
the headset sponge), that created the flames, smoke, smell, and burning in both
executions. See App. Table 9, infra. Ironically, Tafero's and Medina's
executions closely resembled William Kemmler's over a century ago. The fact that
a new and additional set of problems accompanied the execution of James Allen
Davis suggests that a continuing pattern of botches is highly foreseeable.
Indeed, a pattern of consecutive botching also occurred in Virginia even after
the state rewired the electric chair due to prior botching. These problems
prompted Virginia to allow inmates a choice between electrocution and lethal
injection. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 362 & n. 262.
D. Electrocution Contravenes "Evolving Standards of Decency"
"Evolving standards of decency" can be measured by legislative trends
regarding the imposition of a particular punishment. A thorough assessment
should consider legislative changes in execution methods over the course of the
twentieth century, starting with the New York legislature's 1888 selection of
electrocution. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 363-408, 439-64; App. Tables 24, infra.
In general, three themes emerge from an 1888-1999 overview of legislative
trends in the use of the five available methods of execution in the United
States: hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas, and lethal injection.
First, most state legislatures purport to change from one method of execution to
another, or to a "choice" between a state's old method of execution and lethal
injection, for humanitarian reasons, although other factors, such as cost, can
also be [*12] influential. Second, legislatures evidence a fairly consistent
pattern of movement from one method of execution to another, suggesting that
states take notice of the methods used, and the difficulties encountered, by
other states. Third, since 1977, when lethal injection was first introduced, no
state has changed to, or included as an additional "choice," any other method of
execution but lethal injection. In general, states' changes in execution methods
have occurred in the following order: from hanging to electrocution to lethal
gas to lethal injection. The firing squad has been used only sporadically in

only a few states. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 363-408, 439-64; App. Tables
2-4, infra.
In 1853, hanging, the "nearly universal form of execution," was used in 48
"states" (many of which were still considered territories at that time). Nearly
four decades later, however, concerns over the barbarity of hanging and the
subsequent advent of electrocution prompted states to change their method of
execution from hanging to electrocution. Even though the first electrocutions
were grotesquely botched, by 1913, a total of 15 states had changed to
electrocution as a result of "a well-grounded belief that electrocution is less
painful and more humane than hanging." Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180,
185 (1914). By 1949, 26 states had changed to electrocution, the largest number
of states that had ever used electrocution at the same time. However, since
1949, no state has selected electrocution as its method of execution. In other
words, it has been a half century since any legislature has adopted
electrocution as a method of execution. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 363408, 439-64; App. Tables 2-4, infra.
The gradual cessation of states' adoption of electrocution appears to be
attributable to Nevada's switch in 1921 from hanging and shooting to lethal gas
in accordance with the state's new Humane Death Bill. By 1955, 11 states [*13]
were using lethal gas and 22 states were using electrocution. By 1973, 12 states
were using lethal gas and 20 states were using electrocution. Since 1973,
however, no state has selected lethal gas as a method of execution. See DennoII, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 366-67.
With each new lethal gas statute came controversy and constitutional
challenges, both before and after the Court's moratorium on capital punishment
in Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. By 1994, there was a "national consensus" concluding
that lethal gas was not an acceptable method of execution. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa
L. Rev. at 368.
Recent research indicates that there is an even more striking national
consensus rejecting electrocution. Since 1973, 12 states have abandoned lethal
gas as their exclusive method of execution. By contrast, since 1949, 22 states
have abandoned electrocution as their exclusive method of execution. Moreover, 7
of these states have abandoned electrocution in the last six years. See DennoII, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 368-70; App. Tables 1-4, infra.
There are historical differences between the uses of electrocution and lethal
gas that point to states' initial, relative reluctance, to reject electrocution.
First, over the course of the century, states have relied on Kemmler to support
the retention of electrocution whereas no Court case has addressed the
constitutionality of lethal gas. Next, electrocution was introduced three
decades earlier than lethal gas during a time when science was substantially
less advanced; therefore, lethal gas, which was also a considerably more visible
method than electrocution, had the advantage of greater immediate scrutiny.
Nonetheless, electrocution and lethal gas have comparable "legislative
lifelines" (61 years and 51 years, respectively) in terms of the point at which
they were introduced and the point [*14] at which they were no longer adopted,
thereby suggesting comparable periods of tolerance. (Electrocution was first
introduced in 1888 and last adopted in 1949; lethal gas was first introduced in
1921 and last adopted in 1973.) Lastly, lethal gas is more expensive than
electrocution, a factor that states have acknowledged when they have changed
execution methods. See Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 370-71 & n.298.

Recent trends also suggest that state legislatures may have reached a
"sufficient" degree of national consensus in rejecting both lethal gas and
electrocution as execution methods. Although the Court has never specified how
much of a consensus is considered "sufficient," it has rendered punishments
unconstitutional with far less consensus than that shown for lethal gas or
electrocution. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1981), for example, the Court
held the death penalty unconstitutional for some kinds of felony murder,
explaining that of the 36 death penalty jurisdictions, "only" 8, "a small
minority," allowed capital punishment for such an offense. Id. at 792.
Furthermore, even if the Court considered along with these 8 states an
additional 9 jurisdictions that allowed the death penalty for an unintended
felony murder if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances,
the Court emphasized that still "only about a third of American jurisdictions"
would allow a defendant to be sentenced to death for such offenses. Id.
(emphasis added). The Court noted that even though this trend was not "wholly
unanimous among state legislatures . . . it nevertheless weighs on the side of
rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue." Id. at 793; see also
Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 371.
In those cases where the Court has rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to a
particular punishment, there have been far more states employing that particular
punishment than the number of states employing electrocution. See, e.g., [*15]
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the death penalty for 16-year-olds, noting that 22 of the
37 death penalty jurisdictions allowed capital punishment for such youths);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989) (rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally retarded persons,
emphasizing that only two states had prohibited it). See also Denno-II, 82 Iowa
L. Rev. at 371 & n. 306.
Over time, lethal injection has become the overwhelmingly dominant method of
execution. See App. Tables 5-7, infra. Among those inmates executed by either
electrocution or lethal injection between 1978-79 and 1998-99, 75% were executed
by lethal injection and 25% were executed by electrocution. As the total number
of executions from these two methods increased over time (from 1 execution in
1978-79 to 156 executions in 1998-99), the percentage of electrocution
executions declined steadily. The percentage of electrocution executions
declined rapidly from 1980-81 to 1986-87 (from 100% to 56%), increased briefly
in 1988-89 (58%), then declined steadily thereafter. The rapid increase in the
percentage of lethal injection executions can be attributed to the fact that the
increases over time in the total number of executions was driven largely by
increases in lethal injection executions. See id.
There are other issues that bear on "evolving standards of decency." For
example, apart from the United States, no other country in the world uses
electrocution. Of the four remaining states in this country that use
electrocution (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Nebraska), Florida imposes the
most electrocution executions. Since Gregg, more than half of the electrocutions
in this country, and thus in the world, have taken place in Florida. See App.
Table 8, infra.
[*16] Electrocution is also not favored as a method of execution among
respondents in recent public opinion polls. Lethal injection is preferred by
most, if not the great majority, of respondents. See Carla McClain, Arizona Gas
Chamber Stays, Gannet News Serv., Apr. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File (84% favoring lethal injection); George Skelton, Death
Penalty Still Strong in State, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at A1, A18 (63%

favoring lethal injection). Floridians also have indicated majority support for
lethal injection after Davis' execution. See Steve Bousquet, Floridians Favor
Move from Electric Chair to Injection, Poll Shows, Miami Herald, Nov. 8, 1999
(reporting the results of an October, 1999, statewide poll conducted by The
Miami Herald and The St. Petersburg Times, in which 58% of the 600 people
questioned supported a state law to replace the electric chair with lethal
injection). See also, Poll: Electric Chair Unpopular in Florida, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Nov. 7, 1999, at 22a.
The Florida Corrections Commission, the body responsible for overseeing
Florida's electric chair, has also recommended that Florida change to lethal
injection. The Commission's survey of execution methods in other states revealed
that "numerous states had recently changed to lethal injection from
electrocution because it was considered to be a 'more humane method of
execution.'" Provenzano, at * 25 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Lastly, the Humane
Society of the United States and the American Veterinarian Medical Association
consider electrocution a wholly unacceptable method of euthanasia for animals.
In Provenzano, the Florida Supreme Court failed to address these critical
"evolving standards of decency" factors. Clearly, a modern Eighth Amendment
analysis of electrocution reveals the court's unjustified conclusion that
electrocution is constitutional.
[*17]

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE A. GREEN, Louis Stein Professor of Law, Director, Louis Stein Center
for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of Law, 140 West 62nd Street, New
York, New York 10023, (212) 636-6851
Counsel of Record
December 1999
APPENDIX
[*1a]

TABLE 1

CURRENT METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE *
* Statutory and case law documentation for each state can be found in DennoII, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 439-64; KY. REV STAT. ANN. @ 431.220 (1998); TENN. CODE
ANN. @ 40-23-114 (1998); LaGrande v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9<th> Cir.
1999) (California and Arizona).
SINGLE METHOD STATES (28)
LETHAL INJECTION (24)
ELECTROCUTION (4)
Arizona Arkansas California
Colorado Connecticut
Delaware Illinois Indiana
Kansas Kentucky Louisiana
Maryland Mississippi
Nevada New Jersey
New Mexico New York

Alabama Florida
Georgia Nebraska

Oklahoma Oregon
Pennsylvania South Dakota
Tennessee Texas Wyoming

CHOICE STATES (10)
INJECTION OR HANGING (3)
Montana New Hampshire Washington
INJECTION OR FIRING SQUAD (2)
Idaho Utah
INJECTION OR ELECTROCUTION (3)
Ohio South Carolina Virginia
INJECTION OR GAS (2)
Missouri North Carolina
[*2a]

TABLE 2

CHANGES IN THE USE OF ELECTROCUTION BY STATE: 1888-1928
YEAR
STATE
HANGING TO
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
TO
TO
LETHAL GAS
LETHAL
INJECTION
1888
NY
NY
1896
OH
OH
1898
MA
MA
1906
NJ
NJ
1908
VA
VA
1909
NC
NC
1910
KY
KY
1912
SC
SC
VT
VT
1913
AR
AR
IN
IN
NE
NE
OK
OK
PA
PA
TN
TN
1923
AL
AL
FL
FL
TX
TX
1924
GA
GA
1927
IL
IL

NO CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD
[*3a]

CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD

TABLE 3

CHANGES IN THE USE OF ELECTROCUTION BY STATE: 1929-1982
YEAR
STATE
HANGING TO
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
TO
TO

LETHAL GAS
1929
1935
1939
1940
1949
1951
1954
1955
1965
1977
1982

NM
CT
NC
SD
LA
MS
WV
OK
MS
NM
VT *
WV *
TX
MA

NM
CT

LETHAL
INJECTION

NC

SD
LA
MS
WV
OK
MS
NM

TX
MA **

* Year these states abolished the death penalty.
** Choice states. For example, if a state (e.g., Massachusetts) changes from
one execution method (electrocution) to a choice between that method and a new
method (a choice between electrocution and lethal injection in 1982), the new
method (lethal injection) only is shown in the Table.
NO CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD
[*4a]

CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD

TABLE 4

CHANGES IN THE USE OF ELECTROCUTION BY STATE: 1983-1999
YEAR
STATE
HANGING TO
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
ELECTROCUTION
TO
TO
LETHAL GAS
LETHAL
INJECTION
1983
AR
AR
IL
IL
NJ
NJ
1984
MA *
SD
SD
1990
LA
LA
PA
PA
1993
OH
OH **
1994
VA
VA **
1995
CT
CT
IN
IN
NY
NY
SC
SC **
1998
KY
KY
TN
TN

* Year these states abolished the death penalty.
** Choice states. For example, if a state changes from one execution method
to a choice between that method and a new method, the new method only is shown
in the Table.

NO CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD

CHANGE IN EXECUTION METHOD

Note: Statutory and case law documentation for each state in Tables 2-4 may be
found in Denno-II, Iowa L. Rev. at 439-64; KY. REV STAT. ANN. @ 431.220 (1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. @ 40-23-114 (1998); LaGrande v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9<th>
Cir. 1999) (California and Arizona).
[*5a]

TABLE 5

NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTROCUTION AND LETHAL INJECTION EXECUTIONS IN
TWO-YEAR INTERVALS: 1976-1999 *
YEARS
ELECTROCUTION
LETHAL
TOTAL
INJECTION
19760
0
0
1977
19781
0
1
1979
(1.00)
(0.00)
19801
0
1
1981
(1.00)
(0.00)
19825
1
6
1983
(0.83)
(0.17)
198427
12
39
1985
(0.69)
(0.31)
198623
18
41
1987
(0.56)
(0.44)
198815
11
26
1989
(0.58)
(0.42)

[*6a]

TABLE 5 CONTINUED *

* From 1976-1999, executions from other methods (hanging, shooting, and
lethal gas) constituted 2.71% of the total number of executions.
YEARS
ELECTROCUTION
LETHAL
TOTAL
INJECTION
199018
18
36
1991
(0.50)
(0.50)
199218
47
65
1993
(0.28)
(0.72)
199413
72
85
1995
(0.15)
(0.85)
199613
104
117
1997
(0.11)
(0.89)
199810
146
156
1999
(0.06)
(0.94)
TOTAL
144
429
573
(1976(0.25)
(0.75)
1999)

[*7a]

TABLE 6 NUMBERS OF ELECTROCUTIONS AND LETHAL INJECTIONS: 1976-1999

[SEE GRAPH IN ORIGINAL]
[*8a]
1999

TABLE 7 PERCENTAGES OF ELECTROCUTIONS AND LETHAL INJECTIONS:

1976-

[SEE GRAPH IN ORIGINAL]
[*9a] TABLE 8 PERCENTAGES OF EXECUTIONS IN ELECTROCUTION-ONLY STATES:
1976-1999 *
* Total number of executions: 89
[SEE GRAPH IN ORIGINAL]
[*10a]

TABLE 9 * BOTCHED ELECTROCUTION EXECUTIONS FOLLOWING

* Documentation for each blotched electrocution can be found in Denno-I, 35
Wm & Mary L. Rev. at 664-74, and Denno-II, 82 Iowa L. Rev. at 412-24, as
supplemented by Provenzano v. State (Davis).
Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 153 (1976)
1. John Spenkelink, May 25, 1979, Florida:
It took three separate jolts of electricity spread over five minutes to kill
Spenkelink. After the first jolt, smoke filled the room and a threeinch wound
scorched on his right leg.
2. Frank J. Coppola, August 10, 1982, Virginia:
After a second jolt of electrical current, the death chamber filled with the
smell and sizzle of burning as Coppola's head and leg burst into flames.
3. John Louis Evans III, April 22, 1983, Alabama:
Three separate jolts over 14 minutes were required to kill Evans. Flames erupted
from the electrode tied to his leg, and smoke was seen coming from his head and
leg.
4. Robert W. Williams, December 14, 1983, Louisiana:
When the electricity was applied, smoke and sparks appeared from Williams's
head. Witnesses reported the smell of "burning flesh" and "excessive burning."
5. Alpha Otis Stephens, December 12, 1984, Georgia:
It took two two-minute jolts of 2,080-volt electricity, eight minutes apart, to
kill Stephens. After the first jolt, doctors had to wait six minutes for the
body to cool down before examining it. During this time, Stephens took about 23
breaths.
6. William E. Vandiver, October 16, 1985, Indiana:
Indiana's seventy-two year old electric chair took seventeen minutes and five
jolts of electricity to kill Vandiver.
[*11a] 7. Alvin Moore, June 9, 1987, Louisiana:
When examined after his execution, Moore was severely burned on the top of his
head and his epidermis was found to be missing in a wide circular pattern.
8. Wayne Robert Felde, March 15, 1988, Louisiana:
Felde's body evidenced severe third and fourth degree burns. His leg was
mutilated, his skin was coming loose, and "chunks of skin" had been "burned off
the left side of his head . . . revealing his skull bone."
9. Horace F. Dunkins, July 14, 1989, Alabama:
An incorrectly wired chair took nineteen minutes to kill the mentally retarded
Dunkins.
10. Jesse Joseph Tafero, May 4, 1990, Florida:
For four minutes, the executioner applied three 2,000-volt jolts of electricity,
causing flames to shoot from Tafero's head. The medical examiner could not
determine whether Tafero survived the first two jolts.
11. Robert T. Boggs, July 19, 1990, Virginia:
Boggs required two fifty-five second applications of 2,500-volts of electricity.
12. Wilbert Lee Evans, October 17, 1990, Virginia:

During the execution, blood poured from Evans's eyes and nose. Witnesses heard
an audible moan, suggesting suffering.
13. Derick Lynn Peterson, August 22, 1991, Virginia:
Peterson's death occurred after thirteen minutes and two separate jolts of
electricity. After the first series of jolts, Peterson's heart appeared to still
be beating.
14. Roger Keith Coleman, May 20, 1992, Virginia:
Executioners applied two 1,700-volt jolts to kill Coleman. A witness spoke of
smoke coming from Coleman's leg during the execution.
[*12a] 15. Gregory Resnover, December 8, 1994, Indiana:
When the electricity was applied, Resnover rose suddenly "from his chair in a
giant spasm . . . His head jerked back and smoke and spark-like flames came out
of the top of his head."
16. Jerry White, December 4, 1995, Florida:
There were reports that White lunged and screamed during his execution.
17. Larry Lonchar, November 14, 1996, Georgia:
Lonchar moaned and "seemed to gasp for air" as the executioner applied two jolts
of 2,000 volts each to Lonchar's body before he was pronounced dead.
18. Pedro Medina, March 25, 1997, Florida:
"Blue and orange flames up to a foot long shot from the right side of Mr.
Medina's head and flickered for 6 to 10 seconds, filling the execution chamber
with smoke."
19. Allen Lee Davis, July 8, 1999, Florida:
After being jolted with 2,300 volts, blood poured from Davis' face, and soaked a
large portion of his shirt. Testimony indicated that the strap placed across
Davis' mouth hindered his breathing and partially asphyxiated him prior to and
during the electrocution.
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